Introduction
Should a business opportunity, incapable of exploitation by a company, be regarded as that company's opportunity and, as such, be unavailable for unauthorised exploitation by a director thereof? This was one of the many questions raised by the Company Law Review Steering Group.' It is not a new question. The orthodox answer given in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver 2 is that a company's opportunity does not cease to be so merely because the company is unable to exploit it, for example because the company is unable to finance the opportunity's acquisition.' In so doing the court followed the approach established in Keech v Sandford. 4 As evidenced by the responses to the Steering Group's Consultation documents - 5 and Completing the Structure 6 -the orthodox answer retains considerable support 7 (including the support of the Steering Group 8 and an opportunity is a relevant consideration in determining whether the opportunity should be regarded as the company's. This is said to be 'a welcome and realistic position [for English law] to adopt.'
Developing the Framework

22
Following Guth, the application of impossibility arguments gained a measure of acceptance in the US. This may have been encouraged by US adoption of the fairness, or fair-dealing, conception of corporate fiduciary loyalty, discussed below. 23 To the extent that fairness to the company is seen as not harming the company, there is a logic in allowing a corporate fiduciary to raise arguments that the company was not harmed by the action in issue. Nevertheless, impossibility arguments remain controversial. Moreover, even in those jurisdictions that acknowledge impossibility arguments, these arguments remain difficult to prove and there is a trend towards limiting their application by the creation of satellite rules imposing disclosure and/or authorisation requirements.
To assist in the debate on whether English law should recognise impossibility arguments, this article provides a general review of US reactions to impossibility arguments. In the context of this review, the article also considers the role of directors. The intention is to negate the suggestion made by some that English law's current rejection of impossibility arguments is a consequence of an unthinking application of the 'ancient decision' 24 of Keech v Sandford to incorporate 1 8 th and 19 century family trust principles into company law. 25 Underlying such suggestions are two inter-related arguments aimed at supporting the recognition of an impossibility argument. The first argument is that either the duty of loyalty owed by directors or the application of that duty should differ from the duty owed by other fiduciaries. The second argument is that while impossibility arguments may be inappropriate for some fiduciaries (ie the trustee of the family trust) they may be appropriate for others, in particular directors.
US law appears to support both arguments. It accepts that just as different types of fiduciary relationships attract different duties, the application of the duty of loyalty may differ between types of fiduciaries. 26 Illustrating this is a recognition that the law's response to self-dealing by corporate fiduciaries should differ from its response to other fiduciaries (such as trustees). 2 7 Advocates of impossibility arguments gain further encouragement from the suggestion of some commentators that, underlying this development, was a concern that the strict application of traditional fiduciary principles would impede commercial activity which was motivated by corporate fiduciary self-interest. As was noted earlier, similar concerns were presented to the Steering Group to support the impossibility argument. 29 Despite these developments, there is also US recognition that impossibility arguments may be inconsistent with a director's role, and this supports limiting the use of such arguments. Some companies (in particular public companies) depend on their directors (especially inside or executive directors) to identify and then acquire appropriate business opportunities for the company's exploitation. In so doing, a director may be required to develop or approve strategies to overcome any difficulties preventing the company's acquisition or exploitation of the opportunity. This practice illustrates the wider principle endorsed by the Steering Group, that the director's role is to 'promote the success of the company.
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The outcome of this article's review of US reactions to impossibility arguments, and its reflections on the director's role, is to support the Steering Group's implicit recommendation (and its adoption by the Government) that the status of an opportunity should not depend upon whether the opportunity is capable of exploitation by the company.
Guth and the line-of-business test
Guth was the President and dominant director of Loft Inc ('Loft'). As such, he dominated Loft's management. 3 1 Loft was primarily involved in the retail sale of candies, beverages, and foodstuffs. 32 A smaller part of its business was manufacturing syrups for use in soft drinks, and participating in wholesale activities. The case involved Guth's acquisition of the Pepsi-Cola formula and trademark. While Guth's ideas 33 of selling Pepsi in twelve ounce bottles 34 and having licensing agreements with bottlers were important, if not crucial, for transforming Pepsi from a regional drink into a nationwide competitor for Coca-Cola, so too were Loft's financial, 35 manufacturing, 3 6 developmental, 3 7 and retailing 38 assistance. This assistance was provided at Guth's direction and without the knowledge or consent of Loft's board. 39 The court concluded that Guth's activities constituted a breach of loyalty and, in essence, imposed a constructive trust over the Pepsi business in favour of Loft. 40 In so doing the court recognised that the director's role was evolving and that this had implications for defining corporate opportunities. Prior to Guth, the prominent US corporate opportunity test had been the so-called interest/expectancy test.
The interest/expectancy test
The interest/expectancy test is attributed to Lagarde v Anniston Lime & Stone Co, company has some pre-existing property interest, or, to use the language of this test, opportunities in which the company has an interest or which it has a recognized expectancy of acquiring.
In Lagarde, three parties -the Anniston Lime & Stone Co, Christopher, and Martin -each owned one-third of a valuable quarry. In addition, the company had a lease of, and an option to buy, Christopher's land. Members of the Lagarde family became stockholders in the company, and two of them were both directors and officers (ie executive directors). While they were corporate fiduciaries, the Lagardes, personally, acquired Christopher's land. In evaluating this behaviour, the court concluded that the key question was whether the company had either 'an interest already existing' in those parcels of land, or 'an expectancy growing out of an existing right.' 42 Underlying this formulation was a perceived equivalence between restrictions on corporate fiduciaries acquiring opportunities personally and trustee dealings with trust property. 43 Not surprisingly, given the company's option over the land, the Lagardes were held to have breached their fiduciary obligations in purchasing the Christopher land. The result may be justified on the basis of the La ardes' interference with a pre-existing contractual right enjoyed by the company.uBut the court also employed property reasoning, and equated both the option and the right to renew the lease as the company's beneficial or equitable property. Specifically, the option was regarded as creating an 'interest' in the Christopher land and, in reasoning reminiscent of Keech v Sandford, 4 6 the court concluded that the company, as the existing lessee, also had an expectancy in the lease being renewed. 47 Both the option and lease, therefore, were regarded as conferring upon the company a beneficial interest in Christopher's land. Thus the Lagardes' actions could be analogised to the misappropriation of trust property. 48 The interest/expectancy test has some attractive characteristics. Prominent amongst them is the association of corporate opportunities with corporate property. Assuming one agrees with the conclusion that a property right exists and has been infringed, an 'infringement of property' test can provide a relatively noncontroversial and, hence, attractive justification for judicial intervention. Absent authorisation, a corporate fiduciary may not personally exploit an opportunity that belongs to the company: it is misappropriation to do so. The simplicity of this conclusion is a strength of the interest/expectancy test. Nevertheless, the simplicity of the conclusion may encourage some to overlook the fact that the recognition of a property interest is the product of an earlier policy decision. The point is that while the protection of property rights is an established judicial concern, the recognition of a property interest is the product of an earlier policy decision. For example, in Lagarde the court simply accepted two earlier policy decisions as to situations where an equitable interest in land can arise. In short, an option to buy land and, at least in some circumstances, a lessee's expectation that a lease will be renewed, can confer an equitable interest in that land. Unfortunately the impact of 42 these policy considerations is hidden by the now-accepted orthodoxy of the first decision, and the ability to justify the second decision as an extension of the application of the rule in Keech v Sandford. 49 Thus, underlying the apparently 'neutral' interest/expectancy test (neutral in the sense that this test purports to be simply protecting pre-existing property rights), is the question 'why did the courts recognize a property interest here?' Despite its importance, this question is easily overlooked when property rights are claimed. So, while the simplicity of the interest/expectancy test is a strength of the test, that same simplicity is also a weakness. As an aside, rightly or wrongly, the draft Companies Bill 50 continues to use the language of property when referring to a company's opportunity. It does this without giving guidance as to exactly when the opportunity is considered to be the company's. The missing step is left to the courts.
A new dimension to a director's loyalty
Returning to Guth and the line-of-business test, that test was a significant advance because it recognized that the director's role was evolving and that this had implications for the loyalty required of directors (and senior employees in a fiduciary relationship with the company), especially in defining corporate opportunities. The director's new role was to identify and acquire business opportunities for the company. This generated a new concern for corporate fiduciary law: it had to prevent unauthorised personal exploitation of opportunities that the fiduciary should have referred to the company. The result was to impose upon directors, and some senior employees, an obligation to advise the company of certain opportunities and, unless authorised to do so, not to acquire them personally.
This development mirrored the changing nature of the company, in particular the separation of ownership from control highlighted in the 1930's by Berle and Means.
5 1 However, there are different varieties of companies. Indeed, the typical image of a company is the owner-operator company, exemplified by the oneperson or family-run corner convenience store or engineering plant. Ignoring any nominal shareholders and corporate officials who are there to satisfy statutory requirements, such companies revolve around a small group of individuals. The distinguishing characteristic of these companies is that the same group both owns and operates the business.
In the owner-operated company, the owner-operators are entrepreneurs upon whom the ultimate success of the company depends. In such companies, the corporate form is a device to distance the company legally from its members so as to achieve a number of perceived advantages resulting from the company's distinct corporate personality. 52 Not only do the owner-operators run these companies in their own self-interest, but 'the philosophy surrounding the institution of private property' 53 assumes that they will do so. In this context, questions of corporate opportunity do not really arise, at least between the owners and the operators (ie managers), for they are one and the same: 54 'the owners manag[e] and the managers ow[n].' 5 5 Numerically, these owner-operated companies may be the most common, but in economic significance they are dwarfed by public companies. The latter are characterised by a large number of shareholders, each usually owing an insignificant percentage of the total available shareholding. 56 As Berle and Means recognised, 57 the association between ownership and management is missing in these companies. Collectively, shareholders still assert ultimate control (for instance through their ability to vote for new directors), but individually they are usually unable to play any active role in determining the company's direction. The shareholders are investors, and their concern is with the company's bottom line. Control of the company is left to other individuals who owe their position to ability rather than to any shareholding. 59 This has consequences for the corporate opportunity doctrine: the separation of ownership from control means that most shareholders are passive investors, depending upon directors and other senior executives to advance their interests; this includes identifying and then acquiring for the company those opportunities that are suitable for its exploitation.
Through the line-of-business test, Guth refocussed the corporate opportunity doctrine from protecting unauthorised exploitation of opportunities in which a company had some pre-existing interest, to imposing an obligation upon certain company fiduciaries to surrender opportunities to the company. Should the fiduciary fail to surrender the opportunity, the courts would respond by declaring the opportunity to be the company's and imposing a constructive trust over the opportunity in favour of the company. The result was to enlarge the operation of the corporate opportunity doctrine. Guth's recognition and response to this new dimension largely accounts for the subsequent prominence of the line-ofbusiness test.
Imposition of limits to the expanded corporate opportunity doctrine
This expanded corporate opportunity doctrine was accompanied by an appreciation that the new, wider, obligation needed limits that recognised the fact that companies are typically expansionist. such as the ultra vires doctrine, 6 1 it is generally free to pursue any and every opportunity. As a result, unless the law assumes practical limits to the scope of the company's business activities, each and every opportunity that a director or senior employee becomes aware of might potentially come within the expanded notion of corporate opportunity.
Four questions were therefore identified by the court in Guth as particularly relevant in determining whether a corporate fiduciary should not pursue an opportunity for personal benefit. 62 These questions are now treated as relevant in determining whether the opportunity is a corporate opportunity. Collectively referred to by some as the 'Guth Rule,' 63 they are firstly whether the opportunity is, from its nature, in the company's line of business and is of practical advantage to it; secondly whether the opportunity is one in which the company has an interest or a reasonable expectancy; thirdly whether the opportunity brings the self-interest of the officer or director into conflict with that of their company if the officer or director embraces the opportunity; and finally whether the opportunity is one that the company is financially able to undertake?
The first and last questions provide some of the now-necessary limits to the operation of the expanded corporate opportunity doctrine. Although our concern is with the last question, it is worth noting that in practice the requirement that the opportunity be within the company's line of business provides the most important limitation.
Despite Guth's express recognition of an impossibility argument, it is not enough for a director to claim that it was financially impossible for the company to exploit the opportunity. Thus, rather than being a decisive consideration, the thrust of the impossibility question is merely that if a company is financially unable to acquire or develop the opportunity, the court should look more favourably on the director being able to do so. 61 Pursuant to the ultra vires doctrine companies had no legal authority to enter into transactions outside the scope of their objects. Nowadays a company is able to pursue any lawful opportunity. US law recognized this earlier than English law. US companies have the capacity In Guth, since Loft itself provided the resources to develop the Pepsi opportunity, the impossibility question was irrelevant and, not surprisingly, the court gave no meaningful guidance as to what constitutes a financial impossibility. The orthodox approach in Delaware now, however, is to take a strict view. The criterion used is whether the company is actually insolvent. 66 If the company simply lacks the funds to finance the development of the opportunity, courts can be persuaded that the opportunity may be 'sufficiently unique and valuable enough' 67 in itself to enable the necessary finance to be raised. Thus, even in Delaware, financial impossibility arguments are hard to prove.
Extension to other impossibilities
Impossibility arguments are not limited to financial inability. Presumably encouraged by Guth, US courts have been confronted with various arguments to the effect that something that might otherwise be a corporate opportunity is not one because the company is unable to pursue it. 68 The reasons include third party refusal to deal with the company in developing the opportunity; 69 client dissatisfaction with the company; 70 and legal prohibitions.
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The Guth Corollary
In the interests of completeness, it should be noted that the court in Guth identified a further group of questions as relevant to determining whether a corporate fiduciary's acquisition or development of an opportunity constituted disloyalty to the company. 72 These questions are sometimes referred to as the 'Guth Corollary.' 73 They overlap in part with the Guth Rule, and ask firstly whether the opportunity came to the officers or directors in their individual capacity, in contrast to their official capacity; secondly whether the opportunity is essential to the company; thirdly whether the company has any interest or expectancy in the opportunity and finally whether the officer or director has wrongfully used the company's resources in acquiring or developing the opportunity? The existence of the Guth Corollary further reiterates the earlier point that impossibility is merely one of many considerations that are relevant in determining the status of a potential corporate opportunity.
Other US responses
Despite all of this, these impossibility arguments remain controversial in the US. The main reason is fear that 'the inevitable result [will be] to permit the diversion' of the opportunity to the corporate fiduciary. 74 This is because it is 'too difficult to verify' 75 the alleged impossibility 'on the basis of a set of facts largely within the control of the director.' 76 The same concern has been noted in England, for example by Lord Wright in Regal (Hastings The underlying concern is the problem of allowing corporate fiduciaries (or other defendants) to be judges in their own cause. Indeed, it has been argued that an underlying weakness with all impossibility arguments is that, 'if it made economic or business sense to do so, a corporation probably could eliminate [the problem]. ' 
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Adopting this approach, there is a considerable body of US case law rejecting financial inability, and other impossibility arguments, as being decisive considerations. Some courts have done so outright. 82 Others have limited the application of such arguments by insisting that there first be appropriate disclosure of the impossibility and, following the disclosure, that the director has received the appropriate consent to their exploitation of the opportunity. Typically, this consent must be provided by the independent directors.
Although it predates Guth, Irving Trust Co v Deutsch 83 is a prominent example of the rejection of impossibility arguments. The Sonora Products Company of America ('Sonora') had accepted an unconditional offer to buy stock in another company and thereby acquire certain patent rights considered necessary for its business. Deutsch, Sonora's President, was given the task of raising the necessary funds to finance the purchase. Ultimately he advised that he was unable to do so, and then, in conjunction with others, he personally purchased the stock. Deutsch's argument that Sonora's financial inability excused his personal purchase was successful before the trial court, but was rejected by the Court of Appeals.
Viewed against the trial court's finding of fact that Sonora was financially unable to raise the funds, has been seen by some as a rejection of the relevance of the company's financial ability in determining the nature of an opportunity. 84 Indeed, it has even been suggested that this case establishes a 'rigid rule' 85 that precludes a fiduciary from pursuing an opportunity that has been rejected by the company.
This rigid view of Irving Trust might be doubted, however, and there may be less in the assertion that Guth and its line-of-business test takes a considerably 'more relaxed view' 86 of the impossibility argument. The interesting but commonly overlooked feature of Irving Trust is that, although the Court of Appeals accepted the trial court's finding that Sonora lacked the funds to purchase the stock, it expressed its unease about the finding.
8 7 Deutsch personally owed Sonora some $125,000, but no effort was made to collect this money. The court commented that this:
tend [s] ,to show the wisdom of a rigid rule forbidding directors of a solvent company to take over for their own profit a corporate contract on the plea of the company's financial inability to perform. If the directors are uncertain whether the company can make the necessary outlays, they need not embark it upon the venture [ie, enter into the contract]; if they do, they may not substitute themselves for the company any place along the line and divert possible benefits into their own pockets.
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The end result is that although some courts have used Irving Trust to deny the relevance of impossibility arguments, 89 other more recent cases from the same 92 On behalf of the company, Porter prepared an application with another organization for a grant to develop this process. The involvement of the coapplicant was important, if not crucial, to the application's success. Whilst preparing the application, Porter was encouraged by the co-applicant to join with it in presenting their own competing joint application. He did this, and they were awarded the grant. Porter unsuccessfully argued that since co-applicant refused to deal with the Energy Resources Corp Inc, the opportunity was not its opportunity. The court observed:
For the reason that the firmness of a refusal to deal cannot be adequately tested by the corporate executive alone, it has not been favored as a defense unless the refusal has first been disclosed to the company. Without full disclosure it is too difficult to verify the unwillingness to deal and too easy for the executive to induce the unwillingness ... 93 84 Durfee, n 21 above, 530. The Demoulas case involved a family supermarket business, Demoulas Super Markets Inc ('DMS'), founded by two brothers, George and Telemachus. By 1970, DMS owned a chain of fourteen supermarkets. When George died suddenly in 1972, Telemachus assumed control. In the ensuing years, Telemachus established a number of new companies with members of his immediate family as the stockholders. Some of these new companies acquired new supermarkets.
The court held that the new supermarkets were corporate assets, and that DMS had not consented to Telemachus's exploitation of them. In so doing it rejected the argument that it was impossible for DMS to comply with New Hampshire liquor laws restricting the number of liquor licenses any one supermarket chain could have:
We disagree with this argument, which would limit a fiduciary's duty of disclosure to those enterprises judged by the fiduciary to be within the company's leg#l, financial, or institutional capabilities. Establishing such a threshold test for defining a corporate opportunity would contradict the principle ... that a fiduciary who is interested in pursuing an opportunity should not make the decision as to whether the venture is also of interest to the company. Instead, to ensure fairness to the company, opportunities must be presented to the company without regard to possible impediments, and material facts must be fully disclosed, so that the company may consider whether and how to address these obstacles ... Without such a rule, the fiduciary's self-interest may cloud his judgment or tempt him to overlook his duties.
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Guidance for English law
All this attention to US material should not disguise the fact that there are significant differences between US law and English law, so care must be taken when using US material in guiding reforms to English law. One important difference, heralded in the earlier extract from Demoulas, is that US law has developed a different conception of fiduciary loyalty demanded of corporate fiduciaries. This is the duty of fairness or fair dealing. Originally developed to evaluate self-dealing transactions, this duty has spread to influence the corporate opportunity doctrine by introducing two incidental aspects into the line-ofbusiness test (and other corporate opportunity tests). These are a judicial willingness to review a transaction's fairness; and the acceptance of a role for disinterested directors in determining whether a director can personally exploit an opportunity. The second aspect may be a product of the first, ie the availability of judicial review, but its distinct influence is apparent. Associated with both is an obvious emphasis on disclosure.
The scope and implications of this overarching duty of fairness or fair-dealing cannot be appreciated without briefly considering their impact in self-dealing transactions. Applied to such transactions, the duty provides that the transaction is not voidable if: firstly it is fair to the corporation; or secondly it has been authorised or ratified by disinterested directors; or thirdly it has been authorised or ratified by a majority of disinterested shareholders. 95 A failure to disclose may not make an otherwise fair contract voidable, but it may constitute a breach of a distinct duty of disclosure, with the result that the fiduciary is required to account for the resulting profits. Even if the transaction is voidable, the corporation can elect to affirm it and seek an accounting of profits. 96 As one might anticipate with concepts as loose as fairness or fair dealing, US courts have had trouble defining just what constitutes a fair self-dealing transaction. A conventional starting point in determining what fairness entails is the Supreme Court's opinion in Pepper v Litton. 9 7 Considerations mentioned by the court include 'good faith,' 'inherent fairness,' and 'arm's length bargain.'9 But, as commentators have dryly noted, each of these considerations 'is difficult to apply,' 99 and their inter-relationship is unclear. Not surprisingly, 'judicial development of the "fairness" concept has little uniformity.' o Insofar as it is possible to summarize the Delaware approach, the key idea is the equation of fairness with 'conduct by a theoretical, wholly independent board of directors acting upon the matter before them. ' 1 0 1 The court's concern appears to be twofold, evaluating both the substantive fairness of the transaction and the procedure by which the decision to enter into that transaction was made.
Of particular significance in understanding the US approach is an appreciation of the unresolved tensions in its application. The scope of the duty may, it seems, be modified by disinterested director approval so as to lessen the degree of subsequent judicial scrutiny. Disclosure is important to shareholder and disinterested director approval, but there are also indications that US courts see disclosure as a necessary requirement of the duty of fairness, thereby making disclosure a distinct duty. This approach is having its own discernable impact on the scope of the corporate opportunity doctrine.
The growing US emphasis on disclosure
Initial support for the recognition of an independent duty of disclosure is provided by a trio of Delaware decisions in which the Supreme Court used broad language to extend the disclosure obligations of directors when dealing with shareholders. Lynch involved the corporate fiduciary's purchase of the corporation's stock from a stockholder. The court described a duty of 'complete candor,' of 'complete frankness ... [under which c]ompleteness, not adequacy, is both the norm and the mandate' 10 6 to hold that the fiduciary was required to disclose to the stockholder his knowledge of corporate information which suggested that the price paid by the fiduciary was unfairly low.
'[T]he obvious duty of candor required by Lynch' was used in Weinberger to support the rule that 'one possessing superior knowledge may not mislead art stockholder by use of corporate information to which the latter is not privy.' 1 0
There the nominee directors appointed by the majority stockholder did not disclose the existence or results of a feasibility study that they had prepared for the majority stockholder in preparation for a proposed buy-out by the majority shareholder.
Smith concerned the degree of care the directors had taken in giving advice to the stockholders on a merger proposal. The court held that the directors had breached their fiduciary duties to be adequately informed before giving such advice and in 'fail[ing] to disclose all material information such as a reasonable stockholder would consider important' 1 0 8 in voting on the merger proposal.
Further support for the recognition of an independent duty of disclosure is provided by the New Jersey case of Cameco, Inc v Gedicke.1 0 9 Gedicke was a middle manager in Cameco, responsible for arranging the transportation of its food products to retail stores. This required Gedicke to co-ordinate shipping schedules, negotiate shipping rates and supervise those employees involved in the loading process. Unbeknown to Cameco, Gedicke and his wife formed a corporation whose business was arranging the transportation of food products. Two of its clients were Cameco's competitors. The substantive issue was whether this service to competitors constituted disloyalty to Cameco, but the court's attention focused on a procedural point. Moreover, a complete lack of factual findings by the trial court also precluded 'a definitive analysis' of the substantive issue.1 10 Nevertheless, the court emphasized the importance of disclosure to this substantive issue, suggesting that 'employees generally should inform employers of their plans before establishing an independent business that might conflict with that of the employer,' so as to 'alert the employer to potential problems' and to 'protec[t] the employee from a charge of disloyalty. ' 111 The influence of disclosure on the corporate opportunity doctrine
The impact on the corporate opportunity doctrine of this growing emphasis on disclosure is evident in Demoulas. Recall that there the court stressed the need to disclose opportunities: [T] o ensure fairness to the company, opportunities must be presented to the company without regard to possible impediments, and material facts must be fully disclosed, so that the company may consider whether and how to address these obstacles ... Without such a rule, the fiduciary's self-interest may cloud his judgment or tempt him to overlook his duties. 112 recommendation and the position US law appears to be moving towards. Respectively, these are rejecting impossibility arguments but allowing independent directors to authorise another's personal exploitation of the opportunity (the Steering Group's recommendation); and recognising impossibility arguments, but requiring disclosure and confirmation by independent directors of that impossibility and, either directly or by implication, authorisation of the director's personal exploitation of the opportunity (the position US law appear to be moving to).
Should English law recognise impossibility arguments?
Returning to English law and the debate on impossibility arguments, many will argue that there is an inherent attractiveness, if not logic, in the impossibility arguments. This is displayed in the question: 'How can an opportunity be a company's if the company is unable to exploit it? ' This attractiveness or logic may explain in part Guth's acceptance that financial impossibility is one of a number of relevant considerations. However, this recognition raises practical concerns that have resulted in the development of discrete controls on the test, including narrow conceptions of impossibility, ie requirements of actual insolvency and the imposition of disclosure and authorisation requirements, the effect of which is to restrict the availability of impossibility arguments.
There is, however, a more significant objection to impossibility arguments than these practical concerns. The recognition of the impossibility argument per se is inconsistent with the modern expectation that the director's role, especially the executive director's role, is to 'promote the success of the company.' 120 Guth recognised one aspect of this: that the director's task was to identify business opportunities for the company's exploitation. But, as recognised in some of the US material rejecting impossibility arguments, 12 1 there is another aspect to this: the director must also identify impediments confronting the company (eg financial problems), and then either develop strategies to overcome them or evaluate the strategies proposed by others.
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Unconditional acceptance of the availability of impossibility arguments raises real prospects of conflicts of interest. A director who is able to raise impossibility arguments may face the 'temptation to refrain from exerting [ Regal (Hastings)1 24 demonstrates that English courts appreciate the conflict between impossibility arguments and the director's role in overcoming difficulties confronting the company in pursuing an opportunity. 125 There, the company had been actively pursuing the acquisition of a lease of certain cinemas before encountering the landlord's requirements, which apparently precluded its acquisition of the leases. Their Lordships did not suggest that the defendant fiduciaries would be successful in their attempts to find ways for the company to satisfy the landlord's requirements, and thereby enable the company to acquire the opportunity, but nevertheless they would not permit the directors to raise these difficulties to justify their personal acquisition of the opportunity.
Another example is Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley.1 2 6 Cooley was 'an architect of considerable distinction and attainment' 127 in the gas industry. In conjunction with other companies, the plaintiff company provided a comprehensive construction service, largely in the private sector. Wishing to expand into the public sector and gas industry, the plaintiff successfully invited Cooley to become its managing director. Later Cooley was approached personally with an offer to become the project manager for certain projects in the gas industry. Cooley did not advise the company of this opportunity, but resigned to pursue it. In his defence, Cooley argued, and the court accepted, that the party offering the contract would have been unlikely to have employed the plaintiff company.
1 28 Nevertheless, the court rejected this impossibility argument on the ground that it was Cooley's job as the managing director 'to try and persuade [the other party] to change their minds.'
129 The court's recognition of the inconsistency between the impossibility argument and Cooley's role is captured in the following fuller extract of its grounds for rejection:
It cannot be said that it is anything like certain that the plaintiff would ever have got this contract. ... On the other hand, there was always the possibility of the plaintiffs persuading the [party offering the contract] ... to change their minds; and, ironically enough, it would have been the defendant's duty to try and persuade them to change their minds. It is a curious position under which he whose duty it would have been to seek to persuade them to change their minds should not say that the plaintiffs suffered no loss because he would never have succeeded in persuading them to change their minds. 'what he [Cooley] did was to divert to himself the very type of contract it was his job to secure for the company (even though it was very unlikely that the company would have won the contract).' line-of-business test, courts added additional constraints, such as requiring the company to be financially or otherwise able to acquire or exploit the opportunity.
Even though the director's practical role was, indirectly, a reason for recognising impossibility arguments, it is also a reason for viewing those arguments with suspicion. Directors must evaluate the impediments (or impossibilities) that appear to prevent their company from pursuing attractive opportunities, and must then either develop strategies to overcome the impediments or consider strategies proposed by others. So, despite the US recognition of impossibility arguments, it is not surprising that modern US practice is to make such arguments difficult to prove and to curtail their impact through the development of satellite rules. The emphasis on disclosure, especially, has ensured that a director who wishes to pursue an opportunity cannot simply conclude, privately, that it is impossible for the company to pursue it.
The end result is that, in practice, there may be no significant difference between the UK Steering Group's recommendations and the position US law now appears to be moving towards. Despite this, there are certain advantages in the Steering Group's formulation of the rules. As a matter of principle, the rejection of impossibility arguments is more consistent with a director's role and its requirement to avoid conflicts of interest. A director's ability to exploit an opportunity personally should not depend upon some private evaluation of whether or not the opportunity is capable of exploitation by the company. Any necessary flexibility is better provided by allowing the board of directors to specifically authorise the exploitation.
The UK Steering Group's implicit recommendation that the status of a corporate opportunity should not depend upon whether the opportunity is capable of exploitation by the company should be followed. The Government's White Paper does this.
